



W.H. Walsh's Idea of Colligation Reconsidered

Essay

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Scientists divide things up. They analyze. A scientist's occupational disease is the urge to break the world into components – genes, atoms, bytes – before he/she puts it all together again. We do not know any other mechanism how to understand the world: in order to be able to make up the sum of parts, we have to start by dividing the sum into parts.

Siddhartha Mukherjee, *The Gene. An Intimate History* (2017).

Introduction

William Henry Walsh (1913–1986) was a British philosopher specialized in Kant, Hegel and Bradley studies who occasionally, when scientific claims of philosophers of history seemed to go astray, commented on current theorizations of historical explanation. He was the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh in 1960–1979 and held posts at Merton College in Oxford. His seminal *An Introduction to Philosophy of History* (1951) was the very first in the genre of analytical philosophy of history. (Walsh 1976 [1951]; Stanford 1998, 3) [1] Over sixty years and quite a few editions later, it still has considerable relevance and continues to stimulate specialized historians, many monographs and articles reverting to it and discussing it. One of the important contributions includes Hayden White's "Interpretation in History" (White 1992 [1978], 65, 79, n33.) At the time of its publication it went against the high currents as it denounced metahistorical speculations (esp. Toynbee and Spengler et al.) as far-fetched prophesies. With incontestable logic, Walsh also brought the Hempelian neo-positivists (for instance Moritz Schlick, Hans Hahn, Hans Reichenbach) down from the heavens of 'general or covering laws'. His criticism was succinctly applied to 'laws of revolutions' by his disciple William Dray in 1957. (Dray [1957] 1960) Joining the forces of the postwar analytical school of philosophy studying the everyday or common sense language, Walsh emphasized that history proper was the domain of professional historians who dealt with lumps of ideas, facts and phenomena that could be described and understood by colligatory concepts. [2] For historians his concept has



served as a rearguard reassuring example of reasoning, and when the prevalent philosophical atmosphere – for many realist, contextualist and intellectual historians, in particular – was unsympathetic, a constant support. [3] I count myself in this group.

In my paper I will discuss three interlocking topics: A) I will explicate Walsh's concept of colligation in conjunction with his views about explanation, understanding and meaning in history in order to mark out their conceptual contours as a starting-point for the second topic (B), in which I will follow and analyze the rise of the theorization of historical explanation from the end of the 1950s to the eclipse of analytical philosophy of history (end of the 1970s?!) with reference to Walsh's further contributions to it as well as to later (re)evaluations and criticisms of it. In the topic C) I will elucidate the possible contribution of the (B) to postmodern (post)narrativist and representationalist conception of historical explanation, i.e. is it an explanation at all rather than something else (interpretation, representation, narrative etc.). In this connection, I will also outline how the concept of colligation can make sense and be used in teaching the kind of intellectual history me and some others have practiced. Maybe also in this way the role of analytical philosophy of history can be clarified to the students.

The Concept

Let us begin by defining the concept of colligation [4]. Walsh means by it that 'bringing together' or 'adding or summing up' is an operation by which historians correlate events and ideas "under appropriate conceptions" (e.g. Renaissance, Industrial Revolution, pursuit of greatness [5], etc.). The 'added up' ideas or events are supposed to have an intimate relation to each other in that they illustrate their concomitant or successive occurrence and recurrence, i.e. colligation is the result achieved by identifying short-term processes or more or less integrated ideas to which they possibly belong or bear witness. The colligatory operation includes determination of the intentions or purposes of historical agents, identification of the more general ideas ideologies embody and utilization of logical generalizations (distinct descriptions) derived from experience and common sense in "saying what was going on" in a certain movement, process or trend. [6] In this sense, Walsh's colligation seems to form a category of (historical) understanding of its own, and independent of the ways, for example, how scientists operate (cf. Mukherjee's statement above), but not so far from the methods of conceptualizations and generalizations put forward by sociologists or political scientists who study political phenomena and ideologies in contemporary societies. Colligatory concepts are not just decorative wrappers in which meaning is being delivered so that they could be stripped off, or others used in their stead, without making any difference to the 'real' content of history. Colligations, so to say, colonize historians' minds, and we have become used to thinking of the historical world in their terms, irrespective of the fact that every now and then truisms contained in them could be dislodged, jettisoned.

And, as I am going to argue soon, the colligatory concepts can not only be parts of narratives [7] but appear also as general concepts guiding our approaches to intellectual history. As to the role of philosophy of history in the operation of colligation, it has to analyze and clarify its principles, which amounts to explication of the principles of historical explanation applied to it. Moreover, it is recommended that the historian and

the philosopher of history should work here together, or at least complement each other's activities leaving the realm of speculative philosophy of history totally outside their orbit, to the so called 'public history' if anywhere at all. [8]

Let us have a closer look on what the idea of colligation holds for us. Walsh is adamant on the point that a contemporary commentator does not really know the outcome of the processes he is living in and, consequently, cannot formulate any tenable 'conceptions' of them; his pronouncements on them are open to question, whereas the historian has the advantage of hindsight in 'knowing' the result of completed, relatively short-term processes. That Walsh confesses to belonging to the idealist tradition of historical analysis does not prevent him from criticizing Collingwood's idea of rethinking the thoughts of the 'historical' agents (at the time, namely in 1960s, historians really did not care too much about 'marginalized' people) – if historian confines himself only to this, he does not realize the significance of the consequences of their actions, presumed to be the 'results' of their intentions. Historians should be interested in results of actions in as much as in their intentions (thoughts). [9] Evidently, Walsh is here sticking to his somewhat restricted view that it is the historical *processes*, lumps of events and ideas which make up historians' stuff, as if other 'things', e.g. thoughts as such, do not matter so much in history. Maybe he was bored with premeditated history of political ideologies (cf. e.g. Karl Mannheim' studies), which was a rather predominant approach in Europe since the recent moral catastrophe, e.g. during the post war "soul-searching" years.

Walsh also tried to avoid teleology by saying that historical processes are "altogether untidy affairs"; attempts of persons to reach a goal are thwarted by their fellows, incidents, coincidences, circumstances etc., but notwithstanding, the historian can/should find common denominators to them. Walsh's critics, like W.H. Dray who is interested also in the history of ideas, try to spot a problem in this because, in his opinion, it is not so easy to find an end(-result) even for a short-term process or spot certain defining tenets in an ideology which are often so watered. However, he has to admit that again it remains to the historian (who else?) to close a process or specify an ideology; even an age like 'Enlightenment' starts and ends somewhere, and somehow it is finished by some people, and, for example, conservatism has certain, recurring religious and secular, value-laden principal *presuppositions* (Collingwood's term). [10] In view of this, Walsh's colligatory concepts can remain semi-teleological as in the case of 'Enlightenment', which denotes that the agents who espoused and defended 'reason' actually accomplished it. [11]

As a further elaboration Dray gives colligation more rhetoric power binding it to historians' own logic, separate from 'scientists' pursuit of 'causative sequences', by phrasing it as a "synthesis" worked out with an organizing concept which does not have to be an 'effect' of something. [12] In this way, historians look for the *meaning* or *significance* of some event or set of events in a limited context. And, if someone asks how to define what features of an occurrence, a process or a set of ideas should be regarded by the historian as meaningful or significant, the best he/she could do is to record the features of the central subject of study which colligate the items of the data and/or those intimately related to the interest (e.g. choice of trope) and value (e.g. choice of mode of emplotment) to the historian. [13] This work would lead to historians' very

(hopefully) own insight showing itself in the choice of such concepts and notions that are plainly analogical, and accounts 'behind' them will complement rather than contradict each other. Such use of concepts is neither fictional nor artistic ornament to historical inquiry. This much even Hayden White [14], Frank Ankersmit [15] and many others have recently admitted. One can argue that it is of its essence.

Walsh himself detects also other moot points in the manner he had earlier presented the idea of colligation. In answering the question whether colligation is actually something like *interpretation* rather than *explanation*, he concedes that it is being invoked as a stage in interpretation; the historian has to figure out some concept, an abstract idea, or in Hegelian terms, a "concrete universal" to encompass the multitude of events and ideas in a movement, for example. [16] Interpretation is, as it were, the 'end-result' of colligation(s), which make up the historian's work. Some deny this and argue that historians' generalizations, which are based on colligatory concepts are best conceived only as "summaries" rather than universals proper. [17] Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any particular discrepancy here. A bunch of colligatory concepts can as a final interpretation explain what was going on or, to give it a more lofty status, can amount to a *representation* of what could be described even in artistic terms. [18] 'Renaissance' is an interpretation of lump of ideas organized by colligation in order to designate the renaissance and reassessment of humanist ideas and values of the antique world, although 'ancient' scholars still entertained a medieval outlook, and it also may serve as a representation of what actually was the cultural essence of an age without necessarily answering to the questions 'why'. Simultaneously, interpretation built on detailed description and expressed with a colligatory concept helps us to grasp the distinctive frame of political mindset of an era. We have a Finnish candidate here, namely "internal finlandization", connecting dispositional and formal aspects of the colligating term. [19] It may be difficult to argue that it is a 'representative' representation, because it would leave out of consideration many other meaningful aspects of the history of Finnish political culture but a meaningful representation nevertheless. And then we have, for example, plainly dispositional '*rillumarei*' denoting a distinctive cultural mood (*Hauch*, or frame of mind) of the 1950s in Finland. Although it covers only musical or theatrical sections of popular culture and seemingly remains subordinate to high culture, it can open "Rousseauistic" access to the past in our minds possibly generating 'sublime historical experiences' (!) [20], which are impossible for historical study itself to trigger. Consequently, one must confess that in such cases Walsh's colligation does not help in providing further authenticity to historical understanding [21].

According to Walsh's revised formulation, yet another criterion to choose and use *readymade* colligatory concepts is their power to illuminate the build-up of facts, the meaning of which is usually derived from the present, either from the historian's own sophisticated, constructive vocabulary or from the theorizing, for example, of sociology, anthropology, political science or some other neighborhood discipline he/she finds useful or appropriate. [22] Here the demand is that a 'concrete universal' (e.g. Bourdieu's 'habitus') should be evinced by inductive statements telling of facts and ideas. [23] This much Walsh would readily admit, leaving aside the possibility that their import might have been born already in the past. [24] He maintained that particular, individual facts and ideas from the past cannot speak for themselves; it is the historian's

(pleasing) task to make them speak. However, experiencing and writing history remain squarely separate. For a telling example, in Ankersmit's historical vision the continuum of 'speaking' is running the opposite direction; now it is the past that speaks to the historian. It happens prior to conscious reflection by the historian. There is neither constructivism nor psychological processing disturbing this kind of 'speaking' since 'the flow of words' (e.g. a line from a chronicle) presupposes that an historian or any intelligent person dealing with the past could primarily just experience his/her "historical experience" as a sensation before anything like 'history' comes into his/her mind. Here Ankersmit refers to Huizinga's *Waning of the Middle Ages*, thus emphasizing that this experience does not amount to "re-living" of an individual idea (thought) in the Collingwoodian sense of re-enactment but that it is a form of ecstasy akin to understanding of music or the "world by music", for instance. [25] Facing it and making the best of it in history writing depends on the intuitive alertness of the historian to the immediate consequences of the historical experience. It may help him/her in finding colligatory concepts with which to describe, if ever possible, the import of a particular 'historical experience' sensually encountered.

The last problem Walsh deals with is if/whether there is any limitation on the range of concepts, which can be designated and used as colligatory ones. Also this problem seems to have been solved; all such concepts that mean some unity in diversity are appropriate. One can colligate facts and ideas which are diverse but related, in other words, they have a certain, more or less intimate family resemblance (vide: Wittgenstein) or a limited number of common characteristics. [26] What appears to be missing here is that Walsh does not clearly logically differentiate between the possible categories or variations of such concepts, an objection to be discussed in the next chapter.

Re-evaluation and criticism

For its overt simplicity, Walsh's idea of colligation has encountered both appreciation and pointed criticism. One critic maintains that colligatory concepts do not take into account collective social phenomena or other collective activities. Alas, however, this is clearly misplaced since the concepts of 'process' or 'movement' used by Walsh presuppose also a composition of many individual actions or ideas obviously of quite a few historical agents. For him it would have been quite pointless to point this out explicitly. The same could be said against those who wonder whether colligation is actually a species of classification or typology. This seems again to be a matter of choice; certainly colligation means grouping of events, ideas or even people in bundles, the difference from classification and typologies envisaged by sociologists being that for an historian there does not usually exist any *specified* 'classes' or 'types' with which to operate before she/he has completed her/his research into the composites and ingredients which build up a 'class' or a 'type'. [27] When they refer to particular or unique human conglomerates or state of affairs expressed by some colligatory concepts, they may finally also denote some 'class'.

Most used in comparison to other possible 'classes' there is *social* 'class', which is primarily rather static and neutral. It is not referring to any process of movement with semi-teleological goal but standing in need of content which can be provided by

sociologists and historians only, let us say, by observing or gathering various dispositional aspects in social stratification and divergences in distribution of income, wealth, profession, status, manners, life-style, ideology etc. Although one can see mobility up and down in the grade of social 'classes', by definition the 'class' itself stays the same. Of course, such concepts as 'elite', 'intelligentsia', 'bourgeoisie', 'working class' and 'proletariat' have been some of the best candidates for social classification but in which sense, Marxist or Weberian, or are they complementary as Peter Burke suggests? [28] Walsh himself would contend: 'social class' as such, in itself, is not yet another colligatory concept because it lacks specific historical meaning but it is a useful *tool* for colligating social facts about groups of individuals belonging to different social 'classes' [29]. The colligatory labels for such 'classes' are given by historians only after thorough study into a society's structure. This should be quite obvious to any a social historian well-acquainted with the intricacies of a hierarchically built technocratic and bureaucratic university society we live in nowadays.

Most of the criticism leveled against the concept of colligation are rather complementary than dismissive, for example, when the distinction between formal and dispositional concepts is being made. [30] On the one hand, terms such as 'revolution', 'evolution', 'decline' and 'degeneration' are formal because their applicability to historical studies depends on the general nature of the change in question, not so much on nature of the aims and motives of the participating agents in the process. Walsh's point in considering them as colligations would be that their pattern is not necessarily teleological. On the other hand, in case of dispositional concepts, attention is directed to historical wholes, the nature of which *directly* depends on the nature of ideas (plans) shared by the agents involved. Paragon examples of this variant are just 'Renaissance', 'Reformation', 'Enlightenment', and other similar illuminating denominators for historical eras. Even Oakeshott, who was a staunch rationalist, found in them some "limited usefulness" because they contain "particles" of intelligibility and illumination. [31] And these concepts, as so many historically overarching ones (e.g. Humanism), may be decided without reference to any present utility or other than thorough and coherent synthesis of what is presently known about the past thus avoiding any particular ideological implication, too, although they must, in the name of intelligibility and accessibility, do justice to the interests of knowledge of the academia and reading public. [32] Consider, for example, the era-term *fin-de-siècle*, which is outwardly neutral but carries loads of cultural connotations with it, the colligation of which can be made up from the angle of the historian only, not of the historical agents, because the term did not exist 'historically' at the time. This negligence does not, however, mean that the historian should ignore the task of listening or eavesdropping to their 'voices' [33].

Careless attempts at finding an illuminating colligatory concept can obscure the role of intentional ('voicing' or just 'acting') agency in history. In trying to show that the so-called correspondence theory does not suit the theory of history writing, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen deals with a few examples of using such concepts. He does not, however, make clear what qualifies them as colligatory ones in the way Walsh would have demanded. One of his major examples is "Thaw" (cf. its related metaphors Freeze and Night Frost), a loanword from meteorology, first envisaged by fiction writers and soon infiltrated in the histories of socialist countries under Khrushchev's rule. [34] Certainly,

“Thaw” is a nice climatic metaphor and not an *historical* concept, thus not meeting the requirements of colligation but rather showing historians’ temptation to shy away from finding suitable terminology for agency to describe the ‘loosening of the grip’ in the Soviet bloc. If one compares it with *détente*, the difference is that *détente* implies political activity and arouses pacifying associations, at least in public history. Even worse than “Thawism” has been the retrospectively pre-deterministic inclination of nationalistically-minded Finnish historians to select from the history of the period of autonomy certain ‘facts’ that somehow ‘prepared’ Finland for independence. [35] Evidently, they did not even invent *any* fitting concept for such ‘preparation’ (prognosis) in order to colligate them. Notwithstanding, among Kuukkanen’s examples there is one concept which actually is *historical*, namely ‘revolution’. It is not an understatement at all to call it just a “readymade” concept since ‘revolutions’ really happened in history as well as feature(d) in the texts of historians.[36] Consequently, one can argue that there is at least common sense ‘correspondence’ between the historian’s concept and the reality of the past here, irrespective of the fact that facts in the past lived their own lives. This seems to agree with what also Walsh had in mind, and allows us slightly to modify Kuukkanen’s tri-partite definition of colligation. [37]

What comes to (1) *organizing* (italics J-MK) “lower-order data into higher-order wholes”, historians often – if they do not encounter an historical object that has not yet been studied at all - do it the other way round, proceeding from ‘higher-order’ to the ‘lower-order’ level of analysis; they have a ‘whole’, possibly a concept in their minds which stands in need of further verification. One classical example is the Vinogradoff-Maitland -controversy over the content of the concept of mediaeval manor, the outcome of which was a consensual compromise establishing that a manor was not a monothetic but a polythetic entity. [38] This agrees with Kuukkanen’s second (2) part of definition telling that colligatory concepts “categorize without any necessary *shared features* (italics J-MK) or resemblance among sub-ordinated entities”. One would add that *sufficient features* are usually enough to justify the formulation of a more fully meaningful colligatory concept. This apparently supports Kuukkanen’s third (3) part of definition which highlights the particularity of historical phenomena, a commonplace for practicing historians who study limited object-matters of the past.

Application

What comes to my own use of colligatory concepts as a practicing historian, in the early phases of my studies I analyzed the semantic field of some formal concepts adopted from physiology and biology to politics (e.g. ‘degeneration’) but recently I have applied dispositional ones (‘public moralism’) instead. [39] This is to say that nowadays I am an intellectual historian who is not dealing with ideas and ideologies as such but rather with the ‘ideational’ or ‘ideological’ role political thinkers and intellectuals have played in sending their messages in limited political-cultural contexts. I mean that when I have been labelling, following Stefan Collini’s cue, some political thinkers and intellectuals high-flowingly as ‘public moralists’, I have been deflating full-blown attempts to give their ideologies any grand ‘meaning’, bypassing the colligation of ‘leading ideas’ or ‘dominant political trends or ideologies’ of specific historical periods. [40] Again, what I have tried to do was to recover their use of political ideas in such a way that their specific meaning in a certain particular political debate could be characterized and

elucidated as parasitic in morally value-laden discourses. [41] In Walsh's terms, this approach resembles semi-teleological mode of interpretation, which presupposes that the meanings of the concepts of political thinkers and intellectuals have become, so to say, challenged, and could be called 'essentially contested' according to the prevalent values in a political culture. The task of helping to listen or eavesdrop to 'contesting' voices is one of the means analytical philosophy of history – so often declared moribund – has nowadays to offer to intellectual historians, and its practice has been promptly elevated onto a more sophisticated, higher level of generalization than only looking for a 'developmental' history of a concept. [42]

The second role concerns the use of colligation in teaching history at university history departments. We can make history lively and intelligible to students by grouping events and ideas in the colligatory way and present them as contested to a class or lecture audience. This is in no way just any grouping but it presupposes that events and ideas may have a particular kind of familiarity relationship with each other and the grouping can help to make them intelligible as inter-connected parts of a political process (e.g. Hitler's policy of making Germany great) [43], an ideology or a social theory based on value-laden presuppositions. In teaching history, a process may be presented, for example, as 'development', which is heading towards something but possibly not reaching a definite conclusion (even if it was planned or intended). [44] One can also strive to discern (at least) a *relative integration* (italics HW) of the phenomena or ideas (i.e. party political programme in ideological terms) in a historical continuum or current of political thought. [45] This is what, for example, Ville Häkkinen set himself to doing in introducing 'containment' as a serious alternative (precondition?) to 'consolidation' as the key-concept to shed light on the workings of interwar Hungarian political rhetoric. [46] In the situations in which colligatory mode proves helpful, the role of philosophy of history is to guide students to the generalizing way of historical thinking, i.e. to *how* to think historically large. One would call this approach perspectivism because it allows historians to form their own horizons of interest in knowledge while defying the pitfalls of objectivism. This may sound very simplistic and even old-fashioned again but, in its semi-teleological logic, it serves also as a warning against false certainties, idiosyncrasy, determinism and inevitability [47], which may hamper students in early stages of their studies. After the too early announced death of analytical philosophy of history, there have come into being so many 'new histories' which may attract students more than any 'colligation' but, in my opinion, it is not altogether amiss to remind them of the basics. Following Kuukkanen, one can conclude by saying the colligation is "most interesting and useful type of historical language" [48] to be taught to the student of history. Of course, there are other very good types of historical language, but then we have to turn to our neighbouring disciplines and steal concepts from their vocabulary. Walsh's weakness was that he resisted this 'method' and trusted historians to invent them by themselves.

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References

[1] It may already be reckoned that Stanford is quite appreciative of Walsh's ideas by concluding: "It is the connections that matter".

[2] I have discussed some of the contributions in Halmesvirta, 1983: *Kiista historian selittämisestä: analyttistä historianfilosofiaa vuosina 1950–1965*. Yleisen historian tutkimuksia 5. Jyväskylän yliopiston historian laitos. Jyväskylä, 1983, passim.

[3] Leon Pompa's remark, see "Preface". In: *Substance and Form in History*. Eds. L. Pompa and W. H. Dray. University of Edinburgh Press, 1981, xii. Interestingly enough even distinguished Marxists pay heed on this; see e.g. Eric Hobsbawm, *On History*. The New Press: New York, 1997, 42.

[4] In latin: *colligatio*. In logic: The formulation of a general hypothesis which seeks to connect two or more facts.

[5] E.g. Robert Holland, *The Pursuit of Greatness. Britain and the World Role, 1900–1970*. Fontana Press: London, 1991.

[6] Walsh, *An Introduction to Philosophy of History*, 60–65; For a revised version, see W. H. Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History" (1967). In: *The Philosophy of History*. Ed. by Patrick Gardiner. O.U.P., repr, 1978 (1974), 127.

[7] The logic of narrative sentences has been elaborately analyzed by Arthur Danto in his *Analytical Philosophy of History* (1965).

[8] See Louis Mink, "Is Speculative Philosophy of History Possible?". In: *Substance and Form in History*, 115; Anssi Halmesvirta, *Aatehistorian harjoitus*. Jyväskylän yliopistopaino: Jyväskylä, 2012, 35–52.

[9] Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History", 129.

[10] Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History", 130; W. H. Dray, "Colligation under Appropriate Conceptions". In: *Substance and Form in History*, 160–161. Cf. Anthony Quinton, *The Politics of Imperfection. The religious and secular traditions of conservative thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott*. Faber & Faber: London & Boston, 1978, passim.

[11] Walsh, *An Introduction to Philosophy of History*, 60.

[12] William H. Dray, *Philosophy of History*. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1964, 20; Louis Mink, "The Autonomy of Historical Understanding". In: *Philosophical Analysis and History*. Ed. William H. Dray. Harper & Row: New York & London, 1966, 187, 190.

[13] Morton White, *Foundations of Historical Knowledge*. Harper & Row: New York, Evanston & London, 1969, 253, 259–260, 264. Brackets indicate here that the 'choice' can be intentional or unintentional.

[14] Hayden White realizes that Walsh's strategy of explanation can be, I think rightly, called 'Contextualism' in opposition to law-searching Organicism, Formalism and Mechanism. See: Hayden White, *Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore & London, 1973, 18; *Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism*. The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London (5th pr., 1992), 65. Cf. Walsh was himself contending that historians "always" (italics AH) try to make sense of "a stretch of events restricted in time and to some extent also in place" and that they "always" (italics AH) look for meaning (italics AH) or significance of some event or set of events in a limited context" (italics AH). W. H. Walsh, "Meaning' in History". *Theories of History*. Edited with Introductions and Commentary by Patrick Gardiner. The Free Press: New York & Collier-MacMillan Ltd.: London, 1959, 302.

[15] F. R. Ankersmit, *Historical Representation*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2001, 77–79. Ankersmit would even maintain that colligation is just one mode of historical representation – fair enough. See *ibid.*, p. 270.

[16] Ankersmit, *Historical Representation*, 143. Cf. Dray, "Colligation under Appropriate Conceptions", 157; White, "Interpretation in History", 76–77, n. 10. Georg Henrik von Wright realizes that the colligation process resembles the transmutation of quantity to quality in Hegelian and Marxist terms and suggests that Walsh was taking it up from William Whewell's philosophy of induction. In: Georg Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1971, 135, 200, n. 2. Cf. F. R. Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2005, 53.

[17] R. F. Atkinson, *Knowledge and Explanation in History*. The Macmillan Press Ltd.: London, 1978, 111.

[18] Ankersmit, *Historical Representation*, 80–92. One may say that art is the best media to do the job of substituting of something that is absent (cf. horse/hobbyhorse).

[19] Anssi Halmesvirta, "Finlandizálás, a hideg béke és az intő magyar példa" [Finlandization, Cold War and the Alarming Example of Hungary]. *Debreceni disputa*, 9/2008, 4–9.

[20] Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience*, 369.

[21] Walsh would not have recognized such analytically ephemeral phenomena as "world of experience" ('kokemusmaailma') or "emotional climate" ('tunneilmasto') as factual material for conceiving colligatory concepts. Notwithstanding, they show the recent shift towards studying historically subjective experiences. Cf. Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience*, ch. 7.

[22] In this connection Peter Burke's efforts in encouraging history and sociology to work together are remarkable. See e.g. his *Sociology and History*. George Allen & Unwin: London, 1980, *passim*.

[23] Cf. Nietzsche demanding that historians should hold up a *symbol* for an era. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Historian hyödystä ja haitasta elämälle* (1873). Translated by Anssi Halmesvirta. JULPU: Jyväskylä, 1999. This may be too risky to ask because symbols help to develop a cult (cf. Lenin and Mannerheim cults in Finland and Hitler cult in Nazi-Germany). 1936). For this, see Anssi Halmesvirta, "A Foreign Benefactor and Domestic Liberator. The Cults of Lenin and Mannerheim in Finland". *Scandinavian Journal of History*, vol. 34, no. 4, passim; "New Spartans: The Nazi Cult at the Nuremberg Party Congress in 1936 seen through Finnish Eyes". In: *Cultic Revelations. Cult Personalities and Phenomena*. Ed. Anssi Halmesvirta. Historietti: Tampere, 2011, 83–88.

[24] Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History", 140.

[25] Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience*, 119–128; R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*. O.U.P., 1978 (1946), 282–302, 312–313.

[26] Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History", 140; Hayden White, *Metahistory. The Historical Imagination of Nineteenth Century*. The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London. Eight pr. 1993 (1973), 18.

[27] Cf. Cebic, L.B., "Colligation and the Writing of History". *Monist* 53 (1969), 49; McCullagh, B. H., "Colligation and Classification in History". *History and Theory* XVII (1978), esp. p. 277.

[28] Burke, *Sociology and History*, 60–67.

[29] Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History", 129–130. Cf. Raymond Boudon, *Theories of Social Change. A Critical Appraisal*. Transl. J. C. Whitehouse. Polity Press: Cambridge, 2003, 133 contending that sociologists cannot do without historians in studying social phenomena in general.

[30] McCullagh, "Colligation and Classification in History", 272 ff.

[31] Michael Oakeshott, "The Activity of Being an Historian". In: Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*. Methuen: London and New York, 1981 (1962), 162, n. 1.

[32] They belong to the criteria of objectivity. See Allan Megill, *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error. A Contemporary Guide to Practice*. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London, 2007, 107–124.

[33] Cf. Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, Brian Young (Eds.), *History, Religion, and Culture*. C.U.P., 2000; Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, Brian Young (Eds.), *Economy, Polity, and Society*. C.U.P., 2000.

[34] Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, *Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2015, 100–104.

[35] *Ibid.*, 111.

[36] Ibid., 110. Cf. Dray, *Laws and Explanation in History*; E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution 1789–1848*. Acabus: London, 1962.

[37] Kuukkanen, *Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography*, 113.

[38] Burke, *Sociology and History*, 36.

[39] Anssi Halmesvirta, ”Kansallisen vastustuskyvyn puolesta: Konrad Reijo Waara ja degeneraation idea 1880–1918”. *Historiallinen Arkisto*, vol. 105. Ed. Merja Lahtinen. SHS: Helsinki: 1995, 13–69; Anssi Halmesvirta, *The Narrow Path to Freedom: István Bibó's Public Moralism*. UPEF: Jyväskylä, 2019.

[40] Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850–1950*. Clarendon Press: Oxford 1991; Halmesvirta, *The Narrow Path to Freedom: István Bibó's Public Moralism*, Introduction.

[41] Halmesvirta, *The Narrow Path to Freedom: István Bibó's Public Moralism*, Introduction.

[42] For example, 'democracy' has been a 'developing', contested colligatory concept in as much as a 'progressive', contested political system. Cf. John Dunn, *Democracy. A History*. Atlantic Monthly Press: New York, 2005; Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy. Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Europe*. Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2013. On 'contestation' originally: W. B. Gallie, *Philosophy and Historical Understanding*. London, 1964, 166.

[43] ”Interconnectedness” of facts rather than their discrete existence has 'always' concerned historians. See Richard J. Evans, *In Defence of History*. Granta Books: London, 1997, 76.

[44] D. Thompson, “Colligation and History Teaching”. In: *Studies in the Nature and Teaching of History*. Routledge and Kegan Paul: New York, 1967, 95, 103–104.

[45] Cf. White, *Metahistory*, 18.

[46] Ville Häkkinen, *From Counterrevolution to Consolidation? Language of Nation-Building in the Hungarian Parliamentary Debates, 1920-1928*. JYU Dissertations 82. Jyväskylä University Printing House: Jyväskylä, 2019.

[47] For a valuable and amusing antidote against wrong-headed logic in constructing colligatory concepts, see David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies. Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*. Harper Torchbook: New York, 1970, esp. chs. IV, V, VIII and IX.

[48] Kuukkanen, *Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography*, 114.

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